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Abstract
We evaluate the possibilities of the equivalence between tari#s and quotas under incom-
plete information of foreign technologies. We propose two possible criteria, the expected
output and the expected price, for the government to set its quota permits. By using these
criteria, we address the equivalence in domestic production. We show that equivalence in
domestic quantity will depend on the curvature of demand function as well as on the likelihood
of non-binding quotas.




The equivalence of tari#s and quotas, an issue initiated by Bhagwati (1965, 1968), states
that domestic prices are identical when a given level of imports is imposed under either a tari#
regime or a quota regime. According to Bhagwati, the equivalence holds when domestic
market is perfectly competitive. As long as there is some domestic monopoly power, the
equivalence will not hold. In recent years, there has been a wide interest in comparing domestic
prices under tari#s and quotas assuming the domestic market to be oligopolistic, as discussed
by Itoh and Ono (1982, 1984), Krishna (1989), Hwang and Mai (1988), Dockner and Haug
(1990), among others.
This paper discusses the equivalence of tari#s and quotas under asymmetric incomplete
information. A domestic and a foreign ﬁrm are engaged in a quantity competition. The
domestic ﬁrm faces incomplete information about technologies of the foreign ﬁrm, while the
foreign ﬁrm has complete information about the domestic ﬁrm’s technology.
1 Structurally,
 I would like to thank Thomas Romans, Winston Chang, Mitchell Harwitz, Jota Ishikawa, Sun-Chieh Liang
and a referee for insightful comments.
1 As noted by Collie and Hviid (1993), the incomplete information on marginal costs is especially relevant for
micro-electronics industry.
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2 model with the additional complication
of incomplete information. Since there is no well-deﬁned quota that is equivalent to an import
under tari# regime when there is incomplete information of foreign technologies, we recom-
mend two di#erent criteria, the expected output and the expected price under the tari# regime,
for the government to set its quota permits. Our recommended quota permits act only as rule
of thumb and can turn out to be non-binding, we thus have to consider the cases of binding and
non-binding quotas separately.
By using our proposed criteria, we address the equivalence issue in a more limited sense,
i.e., the equivalence in domestic production. We henceforth denote such limited version as the
quantity equivalence, in contrast to the standard version, i.e., the price equivalence, as
discussed in literature. Under the case of binding quotas, we show that quantity equivalence,
in general, will fail to hold except in the linear demand case. Each criterion has its own bias
depending on the curvature of demand function. Speciﬁcally, whether the domestic quantities
under quota regime will be higher or lower than under tari# regime will depend on the
di#erence between the price under quota regime and the expected price, as well as the
di#erence between the slope under quota regime and the expected slope. Once the possibilities
of non-binding quotas are taken into consideration, quantities in quota regime are higher
under the linear demand. Intuitively, the importance of quotas as a protective measure
diminishes once the likelihood of non-binding quotas is introduced.
The discussion of equivalence in domestic production is inevitable due to the dichotomy
between the price and the quantity equivalence under incomplete information.
3 It, neverthe-
less, deserves our attentions from economic perspective. The concern for the domestic job
losses has been one of the most frequently cited arguments against free trade. Since the
domestic output is closely linked to the domestic employment, our discussions can address
more directly to such a concern. In fact, as suggested by Ishikawa (1994), it is surprising that
most studies have examined only the consumer prices. There are surging interests in exploring
other interesting dimensions of equivalence, such as proﬁts and/or economic welfare, as
contained in Itoh and Ono (1982, 1984), Ishikawa (1994), and Konishi (1999).
Several papers during the 90’s have considered the e#ect of asymmetric information on
the strategic trade policy, such as Qiu (1994), Collie and Hviid (1993, 1994, 1999), Brainard
and Martimort (1996, 1997), Kolev and Prusa (1999), among others. One of their major
concerns is: whether policy implications under double/multiple imperfections, i.e., market and
information imperfections, will be closer or away from the ﬁrst best outcome than under single
imperfection. Indeed, due to the di#erent speciﬁcations of incomplete information, Brainard
and Martimort (1996, 1997), Collie and Hviid (1999), Kolev and Prusa (1999) suggested the
interventionist motive is weakened, while Collie and Hviid (1993, 1994) and Qiu (1994)
conﬁrmed that rent-shifting motive is strengthened under incomplete information. Our ﬁn-
dings are closer to the latter view: the equivalence is weakened under incomplete information
of foreign costs.
Comparing with Hwang and Mai (1988) result, where Cournot competition is the
benchmark for the price equivalence, under incomplete information of foreign technologies
2 Following Hwang and Mai (1988), we also disregard the distributional rent e#ect of quota rents.
3 If, instead of domestic incomplete information on foreign costs, there is foreign incomplete information on
domestic costs, quotas can be equivalent to imports under tari#s and it becomes possible to discuss price equiva-
lence.
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +0and, assuming Cournot competition and binding quotas, functional linearity stands out as a
new benchmark for the quantity equivalence. Such a result is more in line with the ﬁndings in
the strategic trade literature such as Brander and Spencer (1984a, 1984b), where the curvature
of function serves as the benchmark for policy implications.
The format of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the equivalence issue
under incomplete information of foreign technologies. The conclusions are contained in
Section 3.
II. Incomplete Information of Foreign Technologies
There are two duopolistic ﬁrms, a domestic ﬁrm and a foreign ﬁrm and each of them
produces a homogeneous good. The inverse domestic demand is given by
PP(q1q2)a n dPQ0, Qq1q2,( 1 )
where q1 and q2 denote the domestic output and the foreign ﬁrm’s imports to domestic market.
Assume there is asymmetric incomplete information that ﬁrm 1 and the domestic government
are not sure whether ﬁrm 2 is of a high cost or a low cost type, while ﬁrm 2 knows exactly the
cost type of ﬁrm 1. Firm 1 holds binomial belief that there is probability q that ﬁrm 2 is of a
high cost type and probability 1q ﬁrm 2 belongs to the low cost type. We denote the cost




respectively. Thus, the strategy (q1, q2h, q2l) and strategy space R
3, the players ﬁrm 1, high
and low types of ﬁrm 2, the belief and types (q,1 q C
2h, C
2l) and the proﬁt function of each














































We can solve for Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome
4 q1, q2h, and q2l using equations
(5), (6), and (7). The second order conditions and stability conditions are assumed to be
satisﬁed. When t0, we can obtain domestic and foreign productions under free trade. For
later references, we use q1 *, q2h * , and q2l * to denote productions under free trade.
4 We limit our discussions to the Cournot case since the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium can not be
applied to conjecture other than Cournot. For the distinction between equilibrium and equilibrium outcome, we
follow Gibbons (1991).
DC I=: :FJ>K6A:C8: D; I6G>;;H 6C9 FJDI6H JC9:G >C8DBEA:I: >C;DGB6I>DC 2003] +1Now consider the case of a quota regime. Under incomplete information, the domestic
ﬁrm as well as the domestic government are uncertain about the exact amount the foreign ﬁrm
is going to export. Thus, under the quota regime, the government will have to conjecture a
quota permit that is approximately close to the level of imports under the tari# regime. It
follows that the foreign production simply may not be equal across both regimes, and we will
have to focus on the equivalence of the domestic production. We propose the following two
possible criteria as rule of thumb for setting the quota permits under incomplete information:








The quota permit in equation (8) are based on the expected output under the tari# regime.
In equation (9), the government issues its permit according to the expected price under the
tari# regime. Both criteria are linear. Under the special case of linear demand, both criteria
suggest the same permit level. In general, these two criteria will suggest di#erent quota levels
when the demand is nonlinear.
In addition, there are possibilities of non-binding quotas, i.e., the prescribed quota might
exceed the free trade import level of the high cost ﬁrm. For example, if the tari# and/or the
probability of high cost ﬁrm are/is su$ciently low so that the expected output criterion
prescribes a quota level very close to q2l, such a quota level might turn out to be non-binding
for the high cost ﬁrm. From the perspective of domestic ﬁrm, it compares whether
 q2 is greater
or smaller than q2h * before solving its maximization problem.




 q1q2h * )P(
 q1q2h * ). (10-a)







If the prescribed quota permit is perceived to be non-binding for the high cost ﬁrm, the


















































By evaluating equations (12-a) and (12-b) respectively on q1, the optimal domestic output
under the tari# regime, we are in a position to compare the amount of domestic production
under the two regimes. Substituting equation (5) into equation (12-a) for the possibilities of
non-binding quotas, we obtain the following expressions:









































Since tari#s and quotas attract attentions mostly due to their protective nature, we start
with the case of binding quotas and examine the possibilities of non-binding quotas subse-
quently. According to equation (13-b), the domestic quantities under the quota regime will be
higher, identical, or lower than under the tari# regime will depend on whether the above
expressions are greater, equal to, or smaller than zero. If the demand is linear, expressions on
the right hand side of equation (13-b) will end up to be zero, and the domestic quantities will
be identical across both regimes. In addition, the same domestic quantities in both regimes will
imply that the domestic prices will be lower (higher) under quotas than under tari#s when the
foreign ﬁrm is of a high (low) cost type. Under nonlinear demand, however, conclusions
regarding domestic quantities can not be taken to infer anything about the domestic prices
unless the quota permits happen to exactly capture the foreign output under tari# regime.
If the domestic government sets its quota permit according to criterion 1, the expected
output, the quantity equivalence will hold under the linear demand.
5 If instead, the govern-
ment follows criterion 2, the ﬁrst part of equation (13-b) will disappear and the di#erence
between the demand slope under the quota regime and the expected slope under the tari#
regime remains as long as the demand is nonlinear. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Assuming duopolistic ﬁrms engage in Cournot competition under incom-
plete information of the foreign ﬁrm’s technologies, the domestic quantities under tari#sa n d
quotas will be identical under the linear demand if the government follows the expected output
or expected price criterion in setting its quota permit and such a quota is perceived to be
binding. The domestic prices will be lower (higher) under quotas than under tari#s when the
foreign ﬁrm is of a high (low) cost type. When the demand is nonlinear and the government
follows the expected price criterion, the domestic quantities under the quota regime will be
higher (lower) than under the tari# regime if the slope at the optimum quota price is greater
(smaller) than the expected slope under tari#s.
Next, consider the case of non-binding quotas. Under the linear demand, all the











l, we know the right hand side of equation (13-a) is positive, this suggests the
domestic quantities are higher under the quota regime. If we take one step further, the
domestic prices will be lower under the quota regime if the foreign ﬁrm turns out to be a high
cost type. Thus, the benchmark for the quantity equivalence has been perturbed once the
likelihood of non-binding quotas is introduced. Clearly, the possibilities of non-binding quotas
diminish the protective nature of quotas, as compared with tari#s. We can summarize our
5 As a referee pointed out, the linearity of demand is a su$cient but not a necessary condition. There still exist
such possibilities that terms in the two brackets cancel out each other while the demand is nonlinear.
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Corollary 1: If the quotas are non-binding for the high cost ﬁrm, the domestic quantities
are higher under quotas than under tari#s when the demand is linear. The domestic prices will
be lower under quotas than under tari#s when the foreign ﬁrm is of a high cost type.
The fact that quantity equivalence fails to hold for a nonlinear demand is not surprising
since a linear policy criterion will certainly fail to capture the nonlinear nature of market
demand. More importantly, whether domestic quantities will be higher or lower under tari#s
than under quotas will depend on 1) the di#erence between the price under quota regime and
the expected price, and 2) the di#erence between the slope under quota regime and the
expected slope. Contrasting with Hwang and Mai (1988) result, where Cournot competition
serves as the benchmark for the price equivalence regardless of the functional form, under
incomplete information of foreign costs and, assuming Cournot competition, the functional
form becomes a benchmark for quantity equivalence.
Incomplete information sheds new light to the equivalence between tari#s and quotas.
Under the quota regime, the importance of foreign incomplete information diminishes since
the domestic ﬁrm cares less about what happens abroad. Thus, if information is quite costly,
the domestic ﬁrm will generally prefer the quota regime since the need to conjecture is reduced.
III. Conclusions
We discuss two alternative criteria, the expected output and the expected price, that
government follows in prescribing its quotas under domestic incomplete information of foreign
technologies. Under this type of incomplete information, it is no longer appropriate to discuss
the equivalence in domestic prices simply because the foreign production may not be equal.
Thus, we examine whether the domestic production under quotas will be equivalent to the
domestic production under tari#s. In addition, the possibilities of non-binding quotas set in
and we have to address cases of binding and non-binding quotas separately. Under the case of
binding quotas, we show that Cournot competition is not su$cient to guarantee the quantity
equivalence of tari#s and quotas except in the linear demand case. As long as the demand is
nonlinear, each criterion will have its own bias depending on the concavity and convexity of
demand and the ﬁrst derivatives of demand. Taken together, the benchmark for quantity
equivalence becomes more restrictive than the benchmark for price equivalence, instead of
Cournot competition as suggested by Hwang and Mai (1988), it now requires the functional
linearity under Cournot competition. In addition, once the likelihood of non-binding quotas is
taken into account, we see the diminishing importance of quotas as a protective measure, i.e.,
domestic quantities under quotas are higher when demand is linear.
Under incomplete information of foreign technologies and binding quotas, the quantity
equivalence will hold as a special case of linearity and it generally will fail to hold under
nonlinear cases. Since most discussions of the policy implications under incomplete informa-
tion are based on linear function, it is worth examining whether the policy implications derived
under di#erent context may also subject to the above qualiﬁcations. For example, our
framework can be used to address whether the voluntary export restraints are voluntary, an
issue initiated by Harris (1985), and examine whether VER and free trade are equivalent
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ,*under incomplete information of foreign costs. However, results derived under such a context
are, most likely, a special case of linearity.
6
R:;:G:C8:H
Bhagwati, J.N. (1965), “On the Equivalence of Tari#s and Quotas,” in: R.E. Baldwin et al.,
eds., Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments: Essays in Honor of Gottfried Haberler,
Chicago, IL, Rand McNally, pp.53-67.
Bhagwati, J.N. (1968), “More on the Equivalence of Tari#s and Quotas,” American Econom-
ics Review 58, pp.142-146.
Brainard, S.L. and D. Martimort (1996), “Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric
Information and Public Contracts,” Review of Economics Studies 63, pp.81-105.
Brainard, S.L. and D. Martimort (1997), “Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletely Informed
Policy Makers,” Journal of International Economics 42, pp.33-66.
Brander, J.A. and B.J. Spencer (1984a), “Trade Warfare: Tari#s and Cartels,” Journal of
International Economics 16, pp.227-242.
Brander, J.A. and B.J. Spencer (1984b), “Tari# Protection and Imperfect Competition,” in:
H. Kierzkowski, ed., Monopolistic Competition and International Trade, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, pp.194-206.
Collie, D. and M. Hviid (1993), “Export Subsidies as Signals of Competitiveness,” Scandina-
vian Journal of Economics 95, pp.327-339.
Collie, D. and M. Hviid (1994), “Tari#s for a Foreign Monopolist under Incomplete
Information,” Journal of International Economics 37, pp.249-264.
Collie, D. and M. Hviid (1999), “Tari#s as Signals of Uncompetitiveness,” Review of
International Economics 7, pp.571-579.
Dockner, E.J. and A.A. Haug (1990), “Tari# and Quotas under Dynamic Duopolistic
Competition,” Journal of International Economics 29, pp.147-159.
Gibbons, R. (1991), Game Theory for Applied Economist, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University
Press.
Harris, R. (1985), “Why Voluntary Export Restraints are Voluntary,” Canadian Journal of
Economics 18, pp.799-809.
Helpman, H. and P.R. Krugman (1989), Trade Policy and Market Structure, Cambridge, MA,
The MIT Press.
Hwang, H. and C.C. Mai (1988), “On the Equivalence of Tari#s and Quotas under Duopoly:
A Conjecture Variation Approach,” Journal of International Economics 24, pp.373-380.
Ishikawa, J. (1994), “Ranking Alternative Trade-Restricting Policies under International
Duopoly,” Japan and the World Economy 6, pp.157-169.
Itoh, M. and Y. Ono (1982), “Tari#s, Quotas, and Market Structure,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 97, pp.295-305.
Itoh, M. and Y. Ono (1984), “Tari#s vs. Quotas under Duopoly of Heterogeneous Goods,”
6 Mai and Hwang (1988) presented a linear variant of Hwang and Mai (1988) with each ﬁrm producing
nonhomogeneous products and showed that VER and free trade are equivalent under Cournot competition. Since
our model is basically an incomplete information version of Hwang and Mai (1988), such discussion can be
further pursued.
DC I=: :FJ>K6A:C8: D; I6G>;;H 6C9 FJDI6H JC9:G >C8DBEA:I: >C;DGB6I>DC 2003] ,+Journal of International Economics 17, pp.359-373.
Kolev, D.R. and T.J. Prusa (1999), “Tari# Policy for a Monopolist in a Signaling Game,”
Journal of International Economics 49, pp.51-76.
Konishi, H. (1999), “Tari#s versus Quotas with Strategic Investment,” Canadian Journal of
Economics 32, pp.71-91.
Krishna, K. (1989), “Trade Restrictions as Facilitating Practices,” Journal of International
Economics 26, pp.251-270.
Mai, C.C. and H. Hwang (1988), “Why Voluntary Export Restraints are Voluntary: an
Extension,” Canadian Journal of Economics 21, pp.877-882.
Qiu, L. (1994), “Optimal Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information,” Journal of
International Economics 36, pp.333-354.
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ,,